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Abstract—We consider two small cell operators deployed in
the same geographical area, sharing spectrum resources from
a common pool. A method is investigated to coordinate the
utilization of the spectrum pool without monetary transactions
and without revealing operator-specific information to other
parties. For this, we construct a protocol based on asking and
receiving spectrum usage favors by the operators, and keeping a
book of the favors. A spectrum usage favor is exchanged between
the operators if one is asking for a permission to use some of
the resources from the pool on an exclusive basis, and the other
is willing to accept that. As a result, the proposed method does
not force an operator to take action. An operator with a high
load may take spectrum usage favors from an operator that has
few users to serve, and it is likely to return these favors in the
future to show a cooperative spirit and maintain reciprocity. We
formulate the interactions between the operators as a repeated
game and determine rules to decide whether to ask or grant
a favor at each stage game. We illustrate that under frequent
network load variations, which are expected to be prominent in
small cell deployments, both operators can attain higher user
rates as compared to the case of no coordination of the resource
utilization.
Keywords—Co-primary spectrum sharing, repeated games, spec-
trum pooling.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the state-of-art mobile communication systems, a network
operator possesses a spectrum license that provides exclusive
transmission rights for a particular range of radio frequencies.
Spectrum assignment based on dedicated licenses resolves the
issues related to inter-operator interference but it also results
in low spectrum utilization efficiency. Inter-operator spectrum
sharing is envisioned as one of the viable approaches to
achieve higher operational bandwidth efficiency and meet the
increasing mobile data traffic demand in a timely manner [1].
In the limited spectrum pool (LSP) scenario, a limited
number of operators share a common resource pool by relying
on more flexible and adaptive prioritization policies than is
currently possible with dedicated licenses [2]. Cognitive radio
technologies are effective measures to resolve the sharing
conflicts over the LSP under vertical spectrum sharing [3],
where the lessor (owner) operator has higher legacy rights
over the spectrum than the lessee operator. On the other
hand, the co-primary or horizontal spectrum sharing scheme
conceptualizes the case where authorized operators possess
equal ownership on the spectrum being adopted [4]. However,
a priori agreements should be made on the spectrum usage
with regard to the long term share of an individual operator.
The multilateral use of shared resources in the LSP can, for
instance, be achieved with channel allocation schemes origi-
nally developed for single-operator systems. These schemes
are in principle applicable to realizes inter-operator spectrum
sharing, provided that the operators are willing to exchange
information and cooperate honestly. Under this requirement,
many spectrum sharing algorithms are available in the litera-
ture. They differ related to the domain where inter-operator
interference is handled, i.e. time, frequency, and/or space.
The cooperative spectrum sharing schemes require a great
deal of network information exchange among the operators,
e.g., interference prices [5], channel state information [6], [7],
etc., and/or employing a central entity to decide upon the
resource allocation. In [5], the operator reports the inflicted
aggregate interference to the spectrum controller, and on
this basis, the controller awards the spectrum pool to the
impacted base stations (BSs). In [6], cooperation amongst the
operators is realized by broadcasting the spectrum occupancy
information, allowing small cells of competitor operators to
avoid interference in accessing the spectrum pool. Similarly,
operators in [7] maintain channel occupancy and spectrum
reservation matrices for opportunistic access to the shared pool.
Although the achievable gains in cooperative schemes are in
general high, operators may be reluctant to share proprietary
information with their competitors and may also have an
incentive to mis-report this information. Finally, information
exchange may incorporate excessive inter-operator signaling
overhead. In this perspective, game theoretic non-cooperative
schemes appear to be a more viable option to share spectrum.
In these schemes, players make decisions independently; they
may still cooperate with competitors but, the cooperation is
entirely self-enforcing.
In [8], [9], operators establish cooperation and play non-
zero sum games to share spectrum. However, the choice of
utility function, encompassing spectrum pricing is undesirable
as it penalizes increased spectrum usage. In [10], the operators
enlist their preferences of partitioning the shared pool and
the outcome is established based on a minimum rule. This
method may not work well in scenarios with load variations,
in which heavily-loaded and lightly-loaded operators will end
up with the same number of orthogonal carriers from the pool.
In [11], [12], operators model their interactions via repeated
games. A common assumption is that they agree in advance
on the spectrum allocation, e.g., at a Nash equilibrium (NE)
in [11] or at an orthogonal allocation in [12] and this allocation
is maintained under the threat of punishment. Auction-based
sharing techniques have been discussed in [13], [14], in which
operators bid competitively for spectrum access through a spec-
trum broker. However, operators may be hesitant in adopting
market-driven sharing schemes as they may not want to touch
their revenue model.
In this paper, we consider spectrum sharing in a setting
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2where no radio access network (RAN) information is revealed
to other operators. We assume that operators are not willing to
monetize spectrum use, keeping spectrum sharing on the RAN
level. Unlike one-shot games, the proposed scheme takes into
account also the history of previous interactions between the
operators and entails the benefits of reciprocity. We illustrate
that a repeated game can be set up so that both operators
achieve better performance in comparison to a static spectrum
allocation. Unlike the repeated game models proposed in [11],
[12], we do not fix the spectrum allocation but we allow
a flexible use of the LSP based on the network load and
interference conditions. By employing the proposed scheme in
a scenario with two operators, we are able to show that under
load asymmetry, both operators can benefit as compared to a
scheme where no spectrum coordination is allowed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the system model. Section III formulates the
repeated game for inter-operator spectrum sharing and presents
the proposed mechanism for negotiating the utilization of the
spectrum pool. Section IV demonstrates performance gains
with the proposed scheme and finally Section V concludes
the paper with a summary and areas for further work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
For simplicity, we concentrate on a spectrum sharing sce-
nario with two small cell operators, Operator A and Operator
B. Each operator has one component carrier (CC) for dedicated
usage. The operators participate also in a LSP and divide it into
K CCs of equal bandwidth. The proposed spectrum sharing
scheme will be used to negotiate the utilization of the K CCs
in the downlink.
We consider a scenario with network load variations. At a
particular time instant, the user distribution is modeled via a
Poisson point process (PPP) with a mean equal to NX users for
Operator X :X ∈ {A,B}. Given the network state, an operator
evaluates a network utility function to describe the quality-of-
service (QoS) offered to its users. It is important to remark
that operators need not employ same utility function nor to
be aware of each other’s utility function. For simplicity, we
assume that both operators maintain a proportionally fair [15]
utility function directly constructed based on the user rates.
UX =
nX∑
n=1
log
(
K+1∑
k=1
rn,k
)
where nX is a particular realization of a PPP with mean NX ,
rn,k is the transmission rate of the n-th user of Operator X
on the k-th CC calculated as
rn,k = wn,kB log2
(
1 +
γn,k
γeff
)
where wn,k is the time scheduling weight of the n-th user
scheduled on the k-th CC, B is the bandwidth of a CC, γn,k
is the downlink user SINR and γeff is the SINR efficiency.
We consider downlink transmissions without power control.
The downlink received signal power for the n-th user on the
k-th CC is Sn,k. Also, let us denote by In,k the aggregate
interference level incorporating both interference from the op-
erator’s own network, and from the other operator’s interfering
BSs. Then, the downlink user SINR is
γn,k =
Sn,k
I0 + In,k
where I0 is the power per CC of thermal noise and other
interference. Note that on the dedicated CC there is no inter-
operator interference.
The scheduling weights, wn,k are determined to maximize
the utility UX .
Maximize :
wn,k
UX .
Subject to :
nX∑
n=1
wn,k = 1 ∀k
wn,k ≥ 0, ∀ {n, k}.
In order to evaluate the effect the opponent operator has
on its utility, an operator may ask its users to measure the
amount of aggregate interference level they receive from the
opponent. This functionality requires that the users are able to
separate between their own and the other operator’s generated
interference. Note that this kind of functionality does not
require any signaling between the two operators. It is assumed
that inter-operator interference measurements are ideal.
III. COORDINATION PROTOCOL
In small cell deployments it is expected to have changing
traffic and interference profiles. Small cell deployments of
different operators sharing spectrum in the same geographical
area can exploit these fluctuations and achieve mutual benefits
by regulating the allocation of CCs. For instance, let us con-
sider spectrum sharing between two operators with unbalanced
traffic loads over a LSP. A lightly-loaded operator can satisfy
its QoS with few CCs and could perhaps stop using some of
the CCs from the pool. An operator that is heavily loaded
at that time would not suffer from inter-operator interference
on the emptied CCs and would be able to meet its QoS too.
However, there should be an incentive for the lightly-loaded
operator to free up some CCs.
Without going to monetary transactions, we propose to
regulate the allocation of CCs by means of spectrum usage
favors asked and granted by the operators. In a LSP, a spectrum
usage favor refers to the following action − an operator
asks its competitor for permission to start using a certain
number of CCs from the pool on an exclusive basis. While
negotiating for spectrum, the operators should agree about the
default utilization of the spectrum pool. In principle, any MAC
protocol could be applied in the default state. We consider that
both operators utilize all the CCs of the pool. A spectrum usage
favor that is exchanged between the operators necessitates a
departure from the default state. The time period a spectrum
favor is valid is agreed between the operators. E.g., a favor can
be valid in the order of seconds, reflecting the time the network
states remain unchanged. After the validity of a favor expires,
the utilization of the spectrum pool falls back to the default
state and the operators will begin a new round of negotiations.
Since the operators will share spectrum for a long time,
an operator taken favors in the past will return them in
future to show a cooperative spirit and maintain the exchange
of favors with its competitor. Monetized compensations or
auction schemes are not considered here. It is a non-trivial task
to design such efficient mechanisms for a limited area and a
limited time, and to couple operator strategies to the income
model of operators. Realizing spectrum sharing in the form of
favors entails the benefits of reciprocity, circumvents monetary-
based spectrum sharing and enables the operators to achieve
mutual benefits without revealing RAN-specific information to
competitors and/or other parties. These make the considered
approach similar to peering agreements in the internet.
3A. One-shot game
We first consider a one-shot game where the operators A
and B are modeled as myopic players. The game is strategic
and non-cooperative. Each player X’s action or strategy, sX ,
is to either ask a favor of k = 1, . . . ,K CCs denoted by
(a1, . . . , ak), grant a favor on k = 1, . . . ,K CCs denoted by
(g1, . . . , gk) or do neither, denoted by n. Let SX denote the
set of such actions for player X .
To specify the outcome of the game, we assume that a favor
is exchanged only if one player plays gl and the other plays
ak with l ≥ k, then the outcome is an exchange of k CCs.
Otherwise, no exchange of favors occur.1
Depending on the outcome, operators draw rewards: (i) the
reward when a player takes a favor is equal to the utility gain
when the interference on k CCs is eliminated, (ii) the reward
when a player grants a favor is equal to the utility loss when
stopping to use k CCs and (iii) the reward when a player does
not ask nor grant a favor is zero. The gains and losses thus
depend on the current internal state of the player in question,
and are not known to the opponent.
In such a game, a final outcome is a NE (sA, sB) ∈ SA ×
SB , from which no player can improve its utility by deviating
unilaterally, i.e., UX
(
sX , s−X
)
≥ UX
(
s∗X , s−X
)
for every
player X = {A,B} and every alternative strategy s∗X ∈ SX .
It is straightforward to see that the NE of the formulated one-
shot game corresponds to the situation where a player always
asks for a favor on K CCs to maximize its reward but never
grants a favor. As a result, both operators would utilize all CCs
from the pool irrespective of the network load and interference
profiles.
The game formulated here differs from the power control
game in [11] in that here the actions are requests of other
player powers, and power control is binary, whereas in [11], the
actions are power allocation profiles across frequency. Also, no
information of other operator state is assumed here. The NEs
of the strategic one-shot games discussed here and in [11],
however, are similar; full usage of the available spectrum is
the only option for a rational player.
B. Repeated game
Since the operators will share spectrum for a long time, the
one-shot game described above will be played repeatedly. In a
repeated game, the action of a player at a stage game depends
not only on the current rewards but also in the sequence of
previous rewards see, e.g., [16]. Repeated games, such as
prisoner’s dilemma have been well-studied and admit a rich
set of equilibrium profiles [16] including various punishment
strategies. The setting here is even more challenging as the
game we are interested in is a stochastic game meaning that
each player’s pay-off depends on a random parameter, namely
the configuration of the users at that time, and moreover the
player’s have imperfect information since they only observe
their own user configuration. We thus have a Bayesian game.
Given this, we focus on a simplified set of stationary threshold
policies and characterize an equilibrium among these policies.
Negotiations of favors on a single CC were considered
in [17]. Here, we extend that to a situation with multiple
CCs. At each stage of the game an operator can compute its
1In other words, here we view the requests as being for a specific number
of CCs and no fewer. Alternatively, one could study a model where the asks
are for up-to that number of CCs so that if l < k a trade for l CCs still occurs.
We leave such a model for future work.
utility gain and utility loss by asking and granting favors on
k CCs for k = 1, . . . ,K . The probability distribution function
(PDF) of the utility gains when Operator X gets a favor on
k CCs is denoted by fX,Gk and similarly, the PDF of utility
losses by fX,Lk . In our system setup, the randomness is only
due to the Poisson distribution of the operator’s own users
(and the user’s corresponding channel gains). Therefore the
PDFs depend only on the network state of the operator’s own
network. However, note that if power control and inter-cell
interference coordination is employed, these distributions may
depend on the state of the opponent operator’s network too.
At each stage game, the Operator X first checks whether to
ask for a favor on K CCs by comparing its immediate utility
gain with a threshold θX,K . If the utility gain is less than the
threshold θX,K , the operator can consider asking for a favor
on (K − 1) CCs instead, and so forth. We assume that an
operator always asks for the largest number of CCs for which
its utility gain exceeds the corresponding threshold. As a result,
the probability that Operator X asks for a favor on k CCs is
equal to the probability that the utility gain from taking a favor
on {j : j = (k+1), . . . ,K} CCs is less than the corresponding
thresholds θX,j and also, the utility gain from taking a favor
on k CCs is higher than the threshold θX,k
P askX,k =
K∏
j=k+1
∫ θX,j
0
fX,Gj (gj) dgj
∫
∞
θX,k
fX,Gk (gk) dgk (1)
where, to simplify the analysis, it has been assumed that the
distributions of utility gains from taking favors on different
number of CCs are independent.
Similarly, the Operator X grants a favor on k CCs upon
being asked, if its immediate utility loss is smaller than a
threshold λX,k and it has not already requested a favor. Taking
into account the fact that an operator cannot ask and grant a
favor at the same stage game, the probability to grant a favor
on k CCs is
P grantX,k =
K∏
j=1
∫ θX,j
0
fX,Gj (gj) dgj
∫ λX,k
0
fX,Lk (lk) dlk (2)
where it has been assumed that the distributions of utility gains
and utility losses are independent.
We assume that the networks of the operators are similar,
and in symmetric relationship with each other, and do not
assume a discount of favors. To get preliminary understanding
on steady state behavior in such a setting, inspired by [18] we
thus assume that averaged over long times, operators give and
take the same amount of equally valuable favors. Hence, favors
would become a rudimentary RAN-level spectrum sharing
currency. Thus we have
K∑
k=1
kP askA,kP
grant
B,k =
K∑
k=1
kP askB,kP
grant
A,k (3)
where the left-hand side describes the average number of CCs
that Operator A gets a favor on, and the right-hand side the
same quantity for Operator B.
An operator can monitor the probabilities of asking and
granting of the opponent and set its own decision thresholds for
satisfying the constraint (3). However, there may be multiple
combinations of thresholds fulfilling the constraint. We pro-
pose to identify the thresholds maximizing an excess utility
∼
U calculated over the NE of the one-shot game (i.e. both
operators utilize simultaneously all the K CCs). The excess
utility for an operator reflects its expected gain from taking a
4favor penalized by its expected loss from granting a favor. In
order to avoid unnecessary complexity in the notation we show
how to set the decision thresholds for Operator A. Similarly,
the decision thresholds for Operator B can be computed.
The excess utility for Operator A is
∼
UA =
K∑
k=1
(ΓA,k − ΛA,k) (4)
where ΓA,k and ΛA,k are the average gain and loss in utility
on k CCs for Operator A such that,
ΓA,k = P
grant
B,k
K∏
j=k+1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj (gj) dgj
∫
∞
θA,k
gkfA,Gk(gk)dgk,
ΛA,k = P
ask
B,k
∫ λA,k
0
lkfA,Lk (lk) dlk
K∏
j=1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj (gj) dgj .
The optimization problem for identifying the decision thresh-
olds is
Maximize :
θA,k,λA,k ∀k
∼
UA,
Subject to : Eq. (3).
(5)
In order to solve this optimization problem, we construct
the Lagrangian function and solve the system of first-order
conditions.
LA =
∼
UA − µA
K∑
k=1
k
(
P askA,kP
grant
B,k − P
ask
B,kP
grant
A,k
)
where µA is the Lagrange multiplier.
Starting with the partial derivative of the Lagrangian in
terms of λA,1 and setting it equal to zero allows computing the
value of the Lagrange multiplier µA = λA,1. Setting the partial
derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to λA,k : k > 1 equal
to zero, and substituting the value of the Lagrange multiplier
into the resulting equation gives
λA,k = kλA,1, k>1. (6)
Next, starting from ∂LA/∂θA,1 = 0 one can determine the
threshold θA,1 as a function of the thresholds λA,k
P grantB,1 (θA,1−λA,1)=
K∑
j=1
P askB,j
∫ λA,j
0
(λA,j− lj)fA,Lj(lj)dlj . (7)
Finally, setting ∂LA/∂θA,k=0, k>1 and using the solution
for θA,k−1, we end up with
θA,k=λA,k
+
P grantB,k−1
P grantB,k
(∫ ∞
θA,k−1
(gk−1−λA,k−1)fA,Gk−1(gk−1) dgk−1 (8)
+(θA,k−1−λA,k−1)
∫ θA,k−1
0
fA,Gk−1(gk−1)dgk−1
)
.
The thresholds λA,k, θA,k∀k that may maximize the La-
grangian must jointly satisfy equations (6)−(8) and also the
constraint (3). Note that the above system of equations does
not accept a closed-form solution but it is straightforward to
solve numerically. Also, from equations (7,8) one can deduce
that θA,k>λA,k ∀k. In the Appendix, we show that the solution
satisfying the first-order conditions and the constraint satisfies
∼
UA > 0. Therefore, the proposed method can achieve better
performance in comparison to the NE of the one-shot game. Fi-
nally, besides the calculation of the Lagrangian at the stationary
point, we also compute it at the borders. The thresholds, either
Fig. 1. Indoor inter-operator deployment scenario. Different colors represent
BSs of different operators.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of utility gains and utility losses for Operator X from
spectrum usage favors over one and two CCs at the end of the initialization.
interior or border, maximizing the Lagrangian are selected.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In order to assess the performance of the proposed coordi-
nation protocol, we consider an indoor deployment scenario
in a hall of a single-story building. The hall is a square with
a side of 50 m. The BSs are partitioned into two groups as
illustrated in Fig. 1 modeling a spectrum sharing scenario with
two operators. The service areas of the operators fully overlap.
A user is connected to the BS of its home network with
the highest received signal level at its location. We consider
a power law model for distance-based propagation pathloss
with attenuation constant 10−4 and pathloss exponent 3.7. The
available power budget on a CC is 20 dBm, the thermal noise
power is −174 dBm/Hz and the noise figure is 10 dB. The
SINR efficiency is γeff =2. The bandwidth of a CC is B=20
MHz. Initially, we consider that the LSP consists of two CCs.
First, we consider an initialization phase of 200 000 simula-
tion snapshots (or equivalently 200 000 stage games). At each
stage game, the user locations are independently generated
according to the PPP and the operators calculate and keep
track of their utility gains and utility losses from taking and
granting favors over one and two CCs. We simulate many
different network loads so that the distributions of utility gains
and utility losses at the end of the initialization can be seen as
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Fig. 3. Rate distribution for the users of Operator A obtained by the proposed
scheme and by static spectrum allocation scheme where the operators always
utilize the pool consisting of two CCs. Unequal mean network loads for the
two operators.
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Fig. 4. Rate distribution for the users of Operator A obtained by the proposed
scheme and by static spectrum allocation. Four CCs. Unequal mean network
loads for the operators.
the steady state distributions over all possible network states.
The different network loads are generated by varying the mean
of the PPP used to model the locations of the users. In Fig. 2
we depict the distributions of utility gains and losses for an
operator at the end of the initialization.
Next, we evaluate the performance in terms of the user rate
distribution over a finite time horizon of 10 000 stage games
following the initialization phase. Initially, the values of the
thresholds are set arbitrarily equal to θX,2 = 3, θX,1 = 1.5,
λX,2 = 2 and λX,1 = 1 for both operators. Every 100 stage
games, the operators’ probabilities for asking and granting
favors are recomputed considering all stage games. Then, the
decision thresholds are updated by solving the optimization
problem (5) and so forth. Given the allocation of CCs at each
stage of the game, the operators compute and keep track of
the user rates. Recall that granted favors are valid only for a
particular stage game. At the end of each stage game, the CC
allocation returns to the default state i.e. both operators utilize
all the CCs of the LSP. The performance of the proposed
scheme is assessed in comparison with the NE of the one shot
game, which is a static spectrum allocation scheme where both
operators utilize all the CCs of the LSP.
First, we consider a scenario with network load asymmetry
between the operators. The mean number of users for the first
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Mbps
CD
F
 
 
One−shot game
Coordination protocol
Fig. 5. Rate distribution for the users of Operator A obtained by the proposed
scheme and also by static spectrum allocation. Four CCs. Equal mean network
loads for the operators.
5 000 stage games are NA = 8 and NB = 2. In the second
half of the simulation, the mean values are reversed. In Fig. 3,
the rate distribution for the users of Operator A is depicted
over the full course of the simulation. In the first 5 000 stage
games, Operator B can mostly cope with fewer or no CCs
due to the lower load and it grants more favors than the
Operator A. In the second half of the simulation, Operator
A returns the favors. Overall, Operator A offers better QoS
in comparison with the QoS attained without any coordination
e.g. it improves its mean user rate by approximately 28 %. The
user rate distribution curves for Operator B follow the same
trend and are not depicted. Fig. 4 depicts the rate distribution
curves for the users of Operator A when the LSP consists of
four CCs. One can see that the mean user rate increases by
approximately 50 % while, the user rate at the 10 % of the
distribution increases by more than 100 %.
Finally, we show that gains due to coordination can be
achieved even in cases with equal mean network loads for the
operators. In that case, the proposed protocol takes advantage
of the instantaneous network load variations. In Fig. 5 we see
that Operator A improves its mean user rate by approximately
25 % for mean number of users NA=NB=5 and four CCs
in the LSP.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered co-primary spectrum sharing
between two small cell operators deployed in the same geo-
graphical area. We considered a scenario where the operators
have equal access rights on a spectrum pool and we proposed a
protocol for coordinating the utilization of component carriers
from the pool. According to it, an operator may ask for spec-
trum usage favors from its competitor. A spectrum usage favor
means that the competitor would stop using some component
carriers from the pool. An operator that has few users to serve
could perhaps cope with less component carriers and grant the
favor. Operators that have taken favors in the past are likely
to return these favors in future and reciprocity is maintained.
We formulated the interaction between the operators as a
strategic, non-cooperative repeated game. Since it is hard to
analyze the proposed game and find its Nash equilibrium,
we resort to a heuristic strategy that uses a threshold-based
test to decide whether to ask or grant a favor at each stage
game. The decision thresholds depend on the current network
realization and also in the history of previous interactions with
6the competitor. We proved that the proposed strategy is strictly
better as compared to the case without coordination between
the operators. We illustrated that in an indoor deployment
scenario, two operators are both able to offer higher user
rates as compared to the case with no coordination, without
revealing any operator-specific information to each other. Our
results show that a rational operator, knowing that the opponent
is rational and has a network with similar characteristics, has
incentive to be cooperative. In future works, operators with
non-similar load and network characteristics will be addressed,
as well as models where the statistics of the underlying Poisson
process changes to reflect e.g. variations in load due to time-
of-day.
VI. APPENDIX
Using the fact that the decision thresholds over the distribu-
tion of utility losses are related as λA,k = kλA,1∀k : k > 1,
one can write write equation (7) as
K∑
k=1
P askB,k
∫ λA,k
0
lkfA,Lk (lk) dlk =λA,1
K∑
k=1
kP askB,k
∫ λA,k
0
fA,Lk (lk) dlk
− P grantB,1 (θA,1 − λA,1) . (9)
Using equation (9) into equation (4), the excess utility can
be read as
∼
UA=
K∑
k=1

P grantB,k
K∏
j=k+1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj (gj) dgj
∫
∞
θA,k
gkfA,Gk (gk) dgk


+ P grantB,1 (θA,1 − λA,1)
K∏
j=1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj (gj) dgj (10)
− λA,1
K∑
k=1
kP askB,k
∫ λA,k
0
fA,Lk (lk) dlk
K∏
j=1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj (gj) dgj .
According to the definition of the probabilities of granting
a favor from equation (2), we note that the last term in
equation (10) is equal to the right-hand side of the constraint
in equation (3) scaled by λA,1. After replacing the last term
of equation (10) by the left-hand side of the constraint in
equation (3), we end up with
∼
UA=
K∑
k=1

P grantB,k
K∏
j=k+1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj(gj) dgj
∫
∞
θA,k
gkfA,Gk(gk)dgk


+ P grantB,1 (θA,1 − λA,1)
K∏
j=1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj(gj) dgj (11)
− λA,1
K∑
k=1
k P askA,k P
grant
B,k .
Using the probabilities of ask a favor from equation (1)
into the last term of equation (11) and replacing back the
decision thresholds, λA,k = kλA,1, the first and the last terms
of equation (11) can be factorized together resulting to
∼
UA=
K∑
k=1

P grantB,k
K∏
j=k+1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj(gj)dgj
∫ ∞
θA,k
(gk−λA,k)fA,Gk(gk)dgk


+ P grantB,1 (θA,1 − λA,1)
K∏
j=1
∫ θA,j
0
fA,Gj (gj) dgj .
which is always positive since θA,k > λA,k ∀k.
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